The authorization to use nuclear weapons (“permission command”) is jointly (“together”) prepared by the president, defense minister, and chief of the General Staff.

The order can be issued two different ways.

Kazbek
The order could be transmitted from one or other of the “briefcases” (Cheget) reportedly in the possession of the president, the minister of defense, and (probably) the chief of the defense staff, or via the Kazbek network.

Kazbek became fully operational in 1985. It supports Kavkaz, a dedicated system of communications between senior government officials designed to operate under the conditions of a surprise attack.

The Chegets also entered service in 1985. These communication devices were conceived as a means of guaranteeing the execution of the launch order (“always”). They are neither necessary nor sufficient to launch nuclear forces.

The “direct command” (launch order) would be sent, via the Chegets, to the units by the General Staff, which holds the codes. At least until the early 1990s, the General Staff and the commanders had to send two different codes to all three branches as an extra layer of authentication.

Three questions remain open:

• What are the exact roles of the defense minister and chief of the General Staff? According to Bruce Blair, until 1991, the permission command was intended to be formed “jointly” by the three leaders. However, he also specifies that the president and the defense minister had to send two separate codes, to be integrated by the chief of the General Staff, who added his or her own code. Valery Yarynich, the author of a reference text on Russian command and control, states that they prepare the authorization “together” (see above); but he also situates the president and defense minister on par as if they would constitute a form of “national command authority” as in the United States, an inheritance of the Soviet Supreme High Command. (He also remains non-committal about the possession of a Cheget by the chief of the General Staff.) If these procedures are still correct, it thus possible that the defense minister acts as a validating political authority (but without whom use would be impossible), and that the chief of the General Staff acts as a validating military authority, without whom use would also be impossible.

What's the nuclear war scenario here, anyway? Putin is more of the cold calculating villain archetype than the crazy loose cannon archetype.